LABOR

LAW-SYMPATHY

STRIKE MAY NOT BE ENJOINED PENDING

ARBITRATION OF ITS LEGALITY UNDER THE NO-STRIKE CLAUSE
OF A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT-Buffalo

Forge Co.

v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
Buffalo Forge Company operated three plants in the vicinity of
Buffalo, New York.' Production and maintenance (P & M) employees
at these plants were represented by Locals 1874 and 3732 of the
United Steelworkers of America, while the office and technical (0 & T)
workers were represented by two other Steelworkers' locals. 2 During
1974, negotiations aimed at establishing a collective bargaining agreement between the 0 & T locals and Buffalo Forge broke down,
whereupon the 0 & T employees struck and set up picket lines at all
3
three plants.
At one location, P & M Local 3732 respected the 0 & T picket
line, and stopped work for one day. 4 However, after learning that all
P & M members planned a general work-stoppage, Buffalo Forge
communicated its view that a sympathy strike would breach the no5
strike clauses of the P & M locals' collective bargaining agreements.
Both local unions, however, observed the picket lines. 6
Buffalo Forge then brought an action in federal district court
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3143 (1976).
2 Id. at 3143-44.
3 Id. at 3144.
' Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 386 F. Supp. 405, 407 (W.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
5 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3144 (1976). The contracts which the two P & M locals maintained with Buffalo Forge included identical nostrike clauses, along with identical grievance and arbitration provisions. Id. at 3143. The
no-strike clause provided in part that
"[tihere shall be no strikes, work stoppages or interruption or impeding of
work. No Officers or representatives of the Union shall authorize, instigate, aid
or condone an' such activities. No employee shall participate in an' such activity. The Union recognizes its possible liabilities for violation of this provision
and will use its influence to see that work stoppages are prevented."
Id. at 3143 n.1 (quoting from Appendix at 16, Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,
96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Appendix]). When a disagreement arose over
the applicability of the terms of the contract to a particular dispute, the agreements
provided that " 'there shall be no suspension of work on account of such differences.' "
96 S. Ct. at 3143 (quoting from Appendix, supra at 17). If the grievance procedure established by the parties failed to resolve a conflict over interpretation of contractual terms,
the agreement then provided that the question " 'be submitted to arbitration upon written notice of the Union or the Company.' " 96 S. Ct. at 3144 n.2 (quoting from Appendix, supra at 19).
6 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 386 F. Supp. 405, 407, 409 (W.D.N.Y.
1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
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under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations (TaftHartley) Act (LMRA) 7 against both the international and the local
unions, 8 seeking, in part, a preliminary injunction pending arbitration. 9 In its complaint the employer contended that under section
301(a) an injunction could appropriately issue pending final determination by the arbitrator.10
The district court found that the P & M locals' sympathy strike
did not give rise to an arbitrable dispute because it had been "preceded and precipitated" by the 0 & T workers' strike. 1 ' According to
the court, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 77012 permitted
an injunction to issue only where the strike had resulted from an
arbitrable dispute. 1 3 Consequently, the ban on injunctions in labor
disputes established by section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 4 was
deemed applicable and the employer's request for an injunction
against the sympathy strike was denied.15
The court of appeals upheld the district court's denial of the injunction on the basis that the strike was not contrary to the federal
policy favoring arbitration, 1 6 and the Supreme Court granted certio7 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). The Act permits "[sluits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization." Id.
8 Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct.

3141 (1976).
9 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3144, 3146 (1976).
10 Id.
11Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 386 F. Supp. 405, 409-10 (W.D.N.Y.
1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
12 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (6-2 decision).
13 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 386 F. Supp. 405, 409-10 (W.D.N.Y.
1974), affd, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976). According to
Chief Judge Curtin's analysis, a federal district court must make the following findings
before an injunction can be issued under Boys Markets:
(1) that the strike is in breach of a no-strike obligation under an effective
agreement; (2) that the strike is over an arbitrable grievance, and (3) that both
parties are contractually bound to arbitrate the underlying grievance which
caused the strike.
386 F. Supp. at 409. For a similar interpretation of the Boys Markets standards, see
Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th
Cir. 1972), discussed at note 38 infra.
14 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
15 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 386 F. Supp. 405, 410 (W.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S.Ct. 3141 (1976).
16Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1975),
aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976). A congressional policy in favor of the formation of private
dispute settlement procedures was established in the Labor Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 20, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97
(1970 & Supp. V 1975)). That Act reads in pertinent part that "[flinal adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is . . .the desirable method for settlement of griev-
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rari. 17 In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 18 the Court, in a
five-to-four decision, held that an injunction halting the sympathy
strike could not be issued while the question of the legality of the
strike itself was being arbitrated. 19 The Court readily agreed that
ance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collectivebargaining agreement." Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 203(d), 29
U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
This federal policy favoring arbitrability was forcefully evoked in three cases known
as the Steelworkers Trilogy: United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
566-68 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582-83 (1960); and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
596-97 (1960). In Warrior & Gulf, the Court made the following statement on the presumption of arbitrability:
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it
may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
363 U.S. at 582-83; see Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1974) (application of presumption of arbitrability in finding safety dispute arbitrable). For a discussion of this presumption, see Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability, 85 HARV. L. REV. 636 (1972).
11Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 423 U.S. 911 (1975).
1896 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
'9 See id. at 3146-49. Writing for the majority was Justice White, id. at 3143, joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Rehnquist. Justice Stevens
was joined in his dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Powell. Id. at 3150.
Prior to addressing the substantive issues of the case, the Court determined
whether the case presented a justiciable controversy. See id. at 3145 n.8. The P & M
employees returned to the job after the district court denied the injunction. However,
the parties agreed before the court of appeals that if the union so ordered, the strike
could be recommenced. Id. at 3144-45 & n.8. This situation-the possibility of a recurrence of the strike-was deemed to be an "existing dispute," thus satisfying the Court's
"live controversy" requirement. See id. at 3145 n.8.
In reaching this conclusion the Court relied on Super Tire Eng'r Co. v. McCorkle,
416 U.S. 115 (1974), and Division 1287, Bus Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74 (1963).
See 96 S. Ct. at 3145 n.8. In Bus Employees, the Governor of Missouri, acting pursuant
to a state statute, had seized a struck public transportation company, but rescinded the
seizure order after the union filed a jurisdictional statement in the Supreme Court. 374
U.S. at 75-77. The Court, noting that the labor dispute underlying the seizure order
remained unresolved and that the seizure could be recommenced at any time, held the
case not moot. Id. at 78. In Super Tire, the initial labor dispute engendering the controversy had ended, but the Court rejected the mootness claim on the basis that the
plaintiff had also sought a declaratory judgment that New Jersey's payment of welfare
benefits to striking workers was unconstitutional. 416 U.S. at 121-22. The Court then
commented upon the difficulties inherent in basing the decision to review a case upon
the length of a strike:
If we were to condition our review on the existence of an economic strike,
this case most certainly would be of the type presenting an issue "capable of
repetition, yet evading review .

. . . Economic strikes are of comparatively short duration. .

.

. [T]he great
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under Boys Markets an injunction could be granted if the strike
sought to be enjoined had "been precipitated by" an arbitrable
grievance. 20 However, lacking the causal requirement of a preexisting dispute which the parties had agreed to arbitrate, the P & M
employees could not be said to have struck "over" an arbitrable
issue.2 1 The case thus being removed from the purview of Boys
Markets, the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the employer's allegation of the illegality of the sympathy strike, an injunction could not
22
be issued prior to a final determination by the arbitrator.
The landmark Boys Markets decision provided federal courts
with the power to enjoin strikes in breach of collective bargaining
agreements. 23 In that case, a supervisor and several non-union workers began reorganizing items in the supermarket's frozen food
section. 2 4 The union representative demanded that the items be
taken out and restocked by union employees. When the supermarket
management refused, the union struck and set up picket lines despite
the presence of a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining
agreement. 25 The management, after offering to arbitrate the dispute,
moved successfully in federal district court to have the strike enjoined.26
majority

...

do not last long enough for complete judicial review of the con-

troversies they engender.
Id. at 125-26 (citations omitted).
20 96 S. Ct. at 3146-47.
21 Id. at 3147 (emphasis in original). For a more extensive analysis of this causal
requirement, see sources cited at note 39 infra.
22 96 S. Ct. at 3148. For a more detailed examination of the majority's reasoning, see
notes 68-79 infra and accompanying text.
23 398 U.S. at 254. Boys Markets has been extensively commented upon. See, e.g.,

Axelrod, The Application of the Boys Markets Decision in the Federal Courts, 16 B.C.
INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 893 (1975); Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions, And the
Judges: The Boys Market Case, 1970 Sup. CT. REV. 215; Note, The New Federal Law of
Labor Injunctions, 79 YALE L.J. 1593 (1970).
24 398 U.S. at 239.
25 Id. at 238-39 & n.4. The collective bargaining agreement also contained a broad
arbitration clause covering " 'interpretation or application of the terms of' "' the contract.
Id. at 238 n.3 (quoting from collective bargaining agreement between Boys Market, Inc.
and Retail Clerks Local 770). For an analysis of the various types of arbitration clauses
and the jurisdiction that they confer, see Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72
HAav. L. REV. 1482, 1497, 1500-01 (1959).
26 398 U.S. at 239-40. The employer originally filed suit in a state court, which
issued a temporary restraining order. Id. The union then responded by removing the
case to federal district court, where it moved to vacate the restraining order. 398 U.S. at
240. The district court denied the motion, issued an order compelling arbitration and
enjoined the work stoppage. Id.
The district court's ruling was not consonant with the Supreme Court's prior decisions in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), and Avco Corp. v. Aero
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In sustaining the district court's decision, the Court was required
to rectify two countervailing federal policy considerations: the Norris-LaGuardia Act's ban on injunctions in labor disputes, and the
need to enforce the union's commitment not to strike-its "quid pro
quo" for the employer's promise to arbitrate. 27 The Boys Markets
Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). See 398 U.S. at 240-47. In Sinclair, the Court had held
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act precluded the issuance of injunctions even when a union
had refused to comply with its duty to arbitrate and had struck in violation of a no-strike
clause. 370 U.S. at 197, 200, 203. The Avco Court held that actions for breach of a
collective bargaining agreement arose under federal law and, therefore, could be removed to a federal district court. 390 U.S. at 561-62. As the Boys Markets Court noted,
these cases jointly rendered it impossible for an employer to obtain injunctive relief in a
state court, since that action could be removed to federal court where, under Sinclair,
an injunction could not be granted. 398 U.S. at 244-45; see 96 S. Ct. at 3154-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Boys Markets Court asserted that such a result contradicted
the Court's prior ruling in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 511 (1962),
which stated that while section 301(a) of the LMRA gave federal courts jurisdiction over
suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements, it did not displace state court jurisdiction. 398 U.S. at 245. In addition, the Boils Markets Court stated that Sinclair-Avco
removal would be incompatible with the federal policy in favor of a uniform labor law
announced in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962). 398
U.S. at 245-46. The cumulative result would be "'rampant forum shopping" which
would "greatly frustrate any relative uniformity in the enforcement of arbitration agreements." Id. Thus, the Boils Markets Court expressly overruled the Sinclair decision. Id.
at 254-55. For an analysis of the Sinclair-Acco problem, see Bartosic, Injunctions and
Section .301: The Patchwork of Avco and Philadelphia Marine on the Fabric of National
Labor Policy, 69 COLU'o. L. REV. 980, 987-96 (1969); Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco and Beyond, 15 VILL. L.
REX'. 32, 39-56 (1969).
27 398 U.S. at 247-52 (emphasis deleted); see 96 S. Ct. at 3147. The concept that
the agreement by the employer to arbitrate constitutes the "quid pro quo" for a nostrike commitment by the union was first announced in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). There the Court found that "the entire tenor of the
history" of the LMRA illustrated that Congress intended the no-strike provision to be a
reciprocal promise for the employer's agreement to arbitrate. Id. This interpretation was
reaffirmed in United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960), and,
again, in Gatewax Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974) (absent an express
agreement to the contrary, no-strike and arbitration clauses should be given "coterminous
application").
Language in other opinions, however, indicates that the Supreme Court will not
always construe the no-strike and arbitration clauses as comprising an exact, precise
quid pro quo. For example, in Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery & Confectionery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962), Drake Bakery brought a suit for damages resulting
from an allegedly illegal strike. Id. at 256. Drake claimed that by striking, the union had
repudiated the arbitration provisions of the contract, thus exempting the employer from
arbitrating the grievance claim. Id. at 260. In holding that the employer had to arbitrate
the issue of damages, the Court stated the following:
We do not understand the opinions in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, . . . or United Steelworkers v.American Mfg. Co., . ..to enunciate a flat
and general rule that these two clauses are properly to be regarded as exact
counterweights in every industrial setting, or to justify either party to the con-
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majority found that Congress had left to the judiciary the task of reconciling Norris-LaGuardia's prohibition on court-ordered injunctions
with the congressional policy, later expressed in section 301(a) of the
LMRA, 28 granting the federal courts jurisdiction over labor contract
disputes. 2 9 In an attempt to reconcile these two policies, the majority
reasoned that the issuance of an injunction under section 301(a) to
compel labor unions to live up to their freely assumed obligations
would not have the effect of subverting what it perceived to be the
Act "to foster the growth and viability
policy of the Norris-LaGuardia
30
of labor organizations."
tract in wrenching them from their context in the collective agreement on the
ground that they are mutually dependent covenants which are severable from
the other promises between the parties.
Id. at 261 n.7 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); accord, Local 721, Packinghouse
Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247, 250-52 (1964).
28 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970), quoted in part at note 7 supra.
29 398 U.S. at 251. The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in part that "[n]o court of the
United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute." NorrisLaGuardia Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). On the other hand, section 301(a) of the LMRA
grants district courts jurisdiction over "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
Writing in 1958, Professor Cox set forth the view that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
"the high water mark of the philosophy that law had no useful role to play in labor
relations." Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 ROCKY MTN.
L. REv. 247, 253 (1958). Labor-management disputes were believed to be best settled
through the use of economic power. Id. at 253-54. This laissez-faire stance of Congress
lasted only a short time as legislative controls were reintroduced into labor relations
three years later by the passage of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372,
49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). Cox,
supra at 254. This reintroduction culminated in the passage of the Labor Management
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-97 (1970, Supp. III 1973, Supp. IV 1974 & Supp. V 1975)). Section 301(a) of the
latter Act was viewed as establishing a congressional policy in favor of the enforcement
of collective bargaining agreements. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 455 (1957). Thus, in Professor Cox's view, "[t]o an undefined extent the NorrisLaGuardia Act ha[d] become an anachronism." Cox, supra at 254.
For a thorough discussion of the role of the federal courts in labor relations prior to
the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, see F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREEN, THE
LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 95-104 (rev. ed. 1949).
30 398 U.S. at 252-53. In reaching this decision the Court relied heavily on a previous decision, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30
(1957), in which the statutory provisions of Norris-LaGuardia were not given literal effect. 398 U.S. at 251-52. In that case an "Adjustment Board" had been created under
the Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, § 3, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C.
§ 153 (1970)), to which union or management could submit disputes for final binding
arbitration. 353 U.S. at 31, 34. The Court reasoned that since the Board was available to
settle disputes, an injunction would not deprive the union of its economic power as had
earlier injunctions. Id. at 40-41; accord, Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n 40, Ry. Employees, 300 U.S. 515, 562-63 (1937).
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Alternatively, the injunction was seen as promoting the peaceful
settlement of labor disputes in two ways. The Court, asserting that
the issuance of an injunction was superior to an action for damages
resulting from a union's breach of a no-strike provision, reasoned that
the unavailability of an injunction would make employers reluctant to
enter into arbitration agreements. 31 Secondly, the Court viewed the
injunction as necessary to insure that the parties did not attempt to
evade the arbitration process by resorting to the use of economic
32

force.
Stressing that its holding was "a narrow one," the Boys Markets
majority limited the use of the injunctive power to cases in which the
collective bargaining agreement contained a mandatory arbitration
clause. 3 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan stated several
guidelines to be followed by district courts in determining whether to
enjoin a strike " 'over a grievance which both parties are contractually
bound to arbitrate.' "34 Beyond the requirement that the ordinary
principles of equity be met, 35 before an injunction can be issued, a

district court must find that the dispute is arbitrable and that the
strike violated the no-strike clause, and it also must order the em36
ployer to arbitrate.
398 U.S. at 248. The majority stated that
[any incentive for employers to enter into such an arrangement is necessarily
dissipated if the principal and most expeditions method by which the no-strike
obligation can be enforced is eliminated. While it is of course true, as respondent contends, that other avenues of redress, such as an action for damages,
would remain open to an aggrieved employer, an award of damages after a
dispute has been settled is no substitute for an immediate halt to an illegal
strike. Furthermore, an action for damages prosecuted during or after a labor
dispute would only tend to aggravate industrial strife and delay an early resolution of the difficulties between employer and union.
31

Id.
Professor Gould has pointed out that the data available in 1970 indicated that the
making of arbitration pacts had not been discouraged by the unavailability of injunctive
relief. Gould, supra note 23, at 230. He noted that, in the eight years between the
Court's decision in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), and the Boys
Markets decision in 1970, "[a]pproximately 94 percent of the collective bargaining
agreements negotiated .. .contain[ed] arbitration clauses" despite Sinclair's prohibition
of the issuance of injunctions to enforce the terms of labor contracts. Gould, supra at
230 & n.63.
32 See 398 U.S. at 249.
33Id. at 253.
34398 U.S. at 254 (quoting from Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228
(1962) (dissenting opinion)) (emphasis added). The guidelines set out in Boys Markets
originally appeared in Justice Brennan's dissent in Sinclair. See 370 U.S. at 228.
35398 U.S. at 254.
36 See id. Several commentators have noted that, although the Court never expressed
the requirement, the existence of an express or implied no-strike clause must be ascer-
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While the word "over" may seem innocuous in the context in
which it is used in Boys Markets, several courts of appeals focused on
that specific term in determining whether Boys Markets was applicable to the sympathy strike situation. The Fifth Circuit, in Amstar
Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 3 7 was the
first appellate court to literally construe the Boys Markets wording
that the strike be "over" an arbitrable grievance.3 8 There the court
interpreted that language to establish a causal relationship: an arbitrable dispute must first have arisen and the work stoppage must have
been the direct result of the dispute. 3 9 The circuit court found that
"the strike itself precipitated the dispute," and, therefore, that a Boys
Markets injunction could not issue. 40 The crux of the Amstar decision
was the belief that the Boys Markets Court intended to restrict the
application of its holding to those cases in which the union and the
employer were in direct dispute "over" a grievance which was in fact
tained. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 613 (1976); Note, Boys Markets

InjunctiQns in Sympathy Strike Situations: A Return to Pre-Norris-LaGuardia Days?, 6
LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 644, 671-73 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Injunctions]; Note, supra
note 23, at 1599-1600; accord, Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974).
37468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972). A number of federal district courts had faced the
issue prior to the Fifth Circuit ruling in Amstar. See General Cable Corp. v. IBEW
Local 1798, 333 F. Supp. 331, 334 (W.D. Tenn. 1971) (sympathy strike enjoined on
theory that dispute over legality of that strike arose when picket lines were set up and
thus "prior to the work stoppage"); General Cable Corp. v. IBEW Local 1644, 331 F.
Supp. 478, 482 (D. Md. 1971) (injunction could not issue because sympathy strike was
not "over" an arbitrable grievance); Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Local 2208, IBEW,
314 F. Supp. 885, 886 (D.N.H. 1970) (injunction denied upon finding that no arbitrable
grievance existed between the union and the employers).
38 See 468 F.2d at 1372-73. The Amstar court read Boys Markets as establishing
three conditions for the issuance of an injunction:
(1) the strike must be in breach of a no-strike obligation under an effective
collective agreement, (2) the strike must be "over" an arbitrable grievance, and
(3) both parties must be contractually bound to arbitrate the underlying grievance which caused the strike.
Id. at 1373.
39Id. at 1372-73. A number of commentators have also interpreted Avmstar as requiring a causal relationship. See Connolly & Connolly, Employers' Rights Relative to
Sympathy Strikes, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 121, 127 (1976); Note, The Applicability of Boys
Markets Injunctions to Refusals to Cross a Picket Line, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 113, 124
(1976). See also Comment, Boys Market: Developments in the Third Circuit, 48 TEMP.
L.Q. 281, 306 (1975).
40468 F.2d at 1373. The court made no finding as to whether the issue of the legality of the sympathy strike was arbitrable. It noted, however, that if it had found that this
issue "constituted a sufficiently arbitrable underlying dispute for a Boys Markets injunction to issue," then practically any strike called before the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement could be enjoined merely by questioning its legality. Id. (emphasis in original). Contra, Abrams, The Labor Injunction and the Refusal to Cross
Another Union's Picket Line, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 178, 184 & n.31 (1975).
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arbitrable. 4 1
A little over a year after Arnstar was decided, the Fourth Circuit
interpreted Boys Markets as permitting an injunction to issue against

42
a sympathy strike. In Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW,
members of the defendant local refused to cross a picket line set
up at their plant by a union local from another of the employer's
plants.4 3 The collective bargaining agreement in force between the
sympathetic union and the company contained both a no-strike clause
prohibiting any "work stoppage" and a mandatory grievance arbitra-

tion provision."

In remanding with instructions to grant injunctive relief pending
arbitration, the Monongahela court noted the strong anti-injunction
stance of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but appraised the federal policy
in favor of settling labor disputes through arbitration as being
"' equally strong.' "45 Emphasizing the broad character of
the language of the collective bargaining agreement, the court held that the
dispute over whether the sympathy strike violated the no-strike
clause was an arbitrable one, and that the case thus fell into the "narrow" exception to Norris-LaGuardia carved out in Boys Markets.4 6

The causal relationship stressed by the Amstar court, i.e., that
the strike be the direct result of a dispute which was arbitrable, was
not addressed by the Monongahela court. 4 7 The main conceptual
41468 F.2d at 1372-74. See also United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236,
1238, 1244-45 (5th Cir. 1975) (decision not to enjoin strike over importation of South
African coal based in part on Amstar's holding that the strike must be the result of an
arbitrable dispute), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 3221 (1976).
42 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973).
4 Id. at 1210.
4Id. at 1210-11 (emphasis deleted). The no-strike clause provided that during the
life of the contract " '[n]o employee shall participate in any . .. strike, work stoppage,
slowdown or any other interference with or impeding of work.' " Id. at 1210 (quoting
from the collective bargaining agreement between Monongahela Power Co. and Local
2332, IBEW) (emphasis by the court). The arbitration clause covered disputes involving
'the interpretation [and] application' " of the contract, including disputes over a
"'claimed violation.' " Id. (quoting from the collective bargaining agreement between
Monongahela Power Co. and Local 2332, IBEW) (emphasis by the court deleted).
45484 F.2d at 1211, 1215 (quoting from Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d
968, 970 (3d Cir. 1972)).
4 484 F.2d at 1213-14. Conceding that employees possess "a statutory right .. .to
refuse to cross . . . picket line[s]," the court nevertheless found that the "right may be
waived and [had been] waived . . . by the action of [the] union in agreeing to a nostrike clause." Id. at 1214. But see Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284,
287 (7th Cir.) (holding that waiver must appear "in 'clear and unmistakeable language' "
in the contract) (quoting from NLRB v. Wisconsin Aluminum Foundry Co., 440 F.2d
393, 399 (7th Cir. 1971)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975); Axelrod, supra note 23,
at 923.
47Professor Abrams points out that the court did not even mention the Amstar deci-
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hurdle for the Fourth Circuit was whether the dispute over the legality of the sympathy strike was arbitrable. 48 Once the determination of
arbitrability was made, the court saw no obstacle to enjoining the
strike, provided the ordinary principles of equity had also been
met. 4 9 In a subsequent case, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed this holding and enjoined a sympathy strike despite the fact that the collective
bargaining agreement had an express exception within the no-strike
clause allowing individual union members to refuse " 'to cross a bona

fide picket line.'

"50

Several other circuits also reached conflicting conclusions on the
issue of whether sympathy strikes are subject to injunctions. 51 The
divisiveness over the injunction question was highlighted in the Third
Circuit decision of NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automative Chauffeurs
Local 926.52 In that case, the defendant local refused to cross a picket
line set up at their plant by Local 110 of the Chauffeurs' Union,
sion even though it was the only circuit court of appeals case on point at the time.
Abrams, supra note 40, at 185 & n.35; see Injunctions, supra note 36, at 653.
48 See 484 F.2d at 1213-14.
41Id. at 1214.
50 Wilmington Shipping Co. v. Longshoremen, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846, 2847 (4th Cir.)
(quoting from collective bargaining agreement between Wilmington Shipping Co. and
union), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1022 (1974). Cf. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 497 F.2d 311, 312-13 (4th Cir.) (conceding that individuals
had right to refuse to cross picket lines, but enjoining local from striking on the ground
that question of whether union was using this individual right to camouflage systemwide strike was arbitrable), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
Additionally, in Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975), the Fourth Circuit held that a sympathy strike could be
enjoined under Boys Markets regardless of whether the no-strike clause was express or
implied when "the work-stoppage [was] over a grievance or involve[d] a matter which
the parties [were] contractually bound to arbitrate." Id. at 1131-32.
51 Compare Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union Local
53, 520 F.2d 1220, 1221-22 (6th Cir. 1975) (injunction denied), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
3221 (1976) and Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263, 268 (8th
Cir. 1975) (injunction could be issued when dispute could "arguably" be concluded by
arbitration 'and was not excluded from purview of the arbitration clause), vacated and
remanded, 96 S. Ct. 3215 (1976) (remanded in light of the Buffalo Forge decision).
The Seventh Circuit, placing strong interpretive emphasis on the breadth of the
arbitration and no-strike clauses, has both enjoined and refused to enjoin sympathy
strikes. See Hyster Co. v. Independent Towing & Lifting Mach. Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89, 92
(7th Cir. 1975) (injunction denied on the grounds that waiver of right to engage in sympathy strike was not explicit and that strike did not give rise to arbitrable dispute), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976); Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293,
298-300 (7th Cir. 1974) (noting broad scope of arbitration clause, court found question
of legality of strike arbitrable and enjoined strike).
52 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (6-3 decision), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974),
noted in Comment, supra note 40, at 306-10; 88 HARV. L. REv. 463 (1974); 21 VILL. L.
REV.

608 (1976).
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which was seeking to become the bargaining representative of the
employees at another NAPA plant.5 3 NAPA claimed that an arbitrable
question existed as to whether the union could refuse to cross the
picket line under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
and, therefore, that an injunction should issue while this matter was
54
being arbitrated.
A majority of the court, utilizing a rationale similar to that of the
Monongahela court, concentrated on that portion of Boys Markets
which emphasized the desirability of arbitration. 55 Boys Markets was
read as holding that where a dispute is determined to be arbitrable,
"an injunction may be issued to enforce" that procedure. 5 6
Finding
the dispute concerning the right to cross the picket line arbitrable,
the majority ruled that the sympathy strike could be enjoined pend57
ing settlement of that issue.

In a cogent dissent, Judge Hunter contended that the majority
had not come to grips with the essential issue before it. 5 8 In his opinion, the majority's ruling that the legality of the sympathy strike was
53 502 F.2d at 322. Local 196 counseled its members that under its interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement they could refuse to cross Local 110's picket lines.
Id. This advice was based on that part of the contract which provided that no violation
would occur " 'in the event an employee refuses to enter upon any property involved in
a primary labor dispute or refuses to go through or work behind any primary picket
lines . . . at the Employer's . . . place or places of business.' " Id. (quoting from collec-

tive bargaining agreement between NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. and Automotive Chauffeurs
Local 926). NAPA Pittsburgh, while acknowledging some connection with NAPA Altoona, id. at 322 n.2, maintained that the picket line at its plant was not primary, id. at
323. Local 110's picket lines would have been primary if NAPA Pittsburgh could have
been shown to be the same employer with which the union was in dispute at Altoona.
See id. at 322 n.2; J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW § 14.9, at 265 n.4 (1969). Since this was the
very issue that the arbitrator would have to determine, the court never decided
whether NAPA Pittsburgh and NAPA Altoona were the same employer. See 502 F.2d at
322 n.2, 323.
54 502 F.2d at 322-23. The collective bargaining agreement bound the parties "to
arbitrate '. . . any and all grievances, complaints or disputes arising between the employer and the union.' " Id. at 323 (quoting from the collective bargaining agreement
between NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. and Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926).
55 502 F.2d at 323. For a discussion of the Monongahela decision, see notes 42-47
supra and accompanying text.
56 502 F.2d at 323.
57 Id. at 324.
58 Id. at 324-25. Judge Hunter was joined by Chief Judge Seitz. Judge Adams also
filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 333-35. While largely agreeing with Judge Hunter,
Judge Adams maintained that he would place more emphasis on the limits of the judicial exception to Norris-LaGuardia created in Boys Markets. Id. at 333. Theorizing that
the Court in that case may not have wanted to extend its holding beyond the narrow
factual considerations of that case, Judge Adams asserted that "[a]bsent a clear signal
from the Supreme Court, doubts should be resolved in favor of the applicability of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act." Id. at 334.
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an arbitrable issue did not adequately resolve the question of whether
the sympathy strike could properly be enjoined. Judge Hunter
phrased the issue for determination as whether, conceding arbitrability, the employer was entitled to injunctive relief while the issue was
being arbitrated. 5 9
The dissent viewed the focal point of its disagreement with the
majority as "the scope of the rule" fashioned in Boys Markets. 60 In
his analysis, Judge Hunter first attempted to distinguish that case
from NAPA in terms of the operative policy considerations in each.
He noted that the Boys Markets Court had been confronted with two
competing federal policies: first, that which favored the arbitration of
disputes and, second, that expressed in Norris-LaGuardia which pro61
hibited the use of injunctions in labor disputes by federal courts.
Because the strike in Boys Markets had endangered the federal policy
in favor of arbitration by attempting to force the employer to concede
on the arbitrable issue 62 it was necessary to partially limit NorrisLaGuardia and allow an injunction to issue. 63 However, since the
sympathy strike in NAPA was "not designed to force settlement of
[an] arbitrable issue before arbitration [could] take place," no need
64
existed to frustrate the policy of Norris-LaGuardia.
The dissent next considered whether "the rule created in [Boys
59Id. at 325. The union, as the dissent noted, never disputed the finding of the trial
court that the issue was arbitrable. Id. at 324.
60 Id. at 325.

61Id. at 325-26. For a discussion of the competing policies the Court faced in Boys
Markets, see notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
62 Id. at 325. Judge Hunter noted that in Boys Markets
the union ignored both its no strike pledge and its agreement to arbitrate the
issue and struck for the avowed purpose of forcing a favorable resolution to the
arbitrable dispute. Thus, the union's actions made it clear that they did not
intend to return to work until the Company conceded that the tasks involved
had to be performed by union men.
Clearly, this strike had the effect of undermining the rule of law that favors
the arbitration of labor disputes, since the strike was an attempt to force a union
victory on the very issue that was made arbitrable not through the presentation
of reasoned arguments to a neutral arbitrator, but rather through the use of
sheer economic force.
Id.
,, Id. at 326.
64 Id. (emphasis deleted). The dissent supported this analysis by noting that since
the union was not striking over its right to respect the picket lines, the employer could
not have ended the strike by capitulating on that issue. Id. The result would have been
different if the union had taken the position that it would not return to work until the
employer acceded to its interpretation of the no-strike clause. In that situation, the
strike would have been a direct attempt to settle an arbitrable issue through economic
pressure, and a Boys Markets injunction would have been appropriate in order to protect the arbitration process. Id. at 326 n.6; see 21 VILL. L. REV. 608, 612 (1976).
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Markets] encornpass[ed] the factual situation" in NAPA. 6 5 According
to the dissent's exegesis of the Boys Markets holding, a strike could
be enjoined only when "the 'underlying cause' of [that] strike" was a
dispute which both parties had agreed to arbitrate. 66 Applying this
analysis to NAPA, Judge Hunter found that the dispute underlying
the sympathy strike was the conflict between NAPA and its Altoona
employees. While the dispute over the legality of the sympathy strike
was admittedly arbitrable, it was not the underlying cause of the
strike; therefore, it did not justify the issuance of a Boys Markets
injunction. 67
In Buffalo Forge, the Supreme Court, utilizing an approach similar to that of the dissent in NAPA,68 perceived no threat to the arbiThe dissent also foresaw an injunction in a sympathy strike situation as hindering
rather than safeguarding the arbitration process. 502 F.2d at 327. Once having obtained
an injunction by simply demonstrating the arbitrability of the dispute over the legality
of the sympathy strike, the employer would have successfully ended the work stoppage
and would likely procrastinate, rather than proceed to arbitration and risk losing on the
merits. Id. The majority attempted to ameliorate this possible result by calling upon the
district courts to use their equitable powers to ensure prompt arbitration. Id. at 324. The
dissent, however, maintained that a district court would be powerless to prevent the
employer from considerably delaying arbitration. Id. at 328. In NAPA, the employer
could have postponed final disposition for at least nine days by going through the various steps of the grievance and arbitration process. Id. at 328-29. Since strikes are so
dependent on proper timing, this delay could possibly "render . . . ineffective" even
those strikes that the aribtrator finds to be legal. Id. at 329.
5 502 F.2d at 329.
6 Id. at 330. Judge Hunter based this interpretation on three considerations. First,
he read the "over" language of Boys Markets as requiring a causal relationship between
the strike and the dispute. Id. Secondly, since the Boys Markets Court had termed its
holding "a 'narrow' one," the dissent construed this as limiting the decision to "the key
factual circumstances that were present in [that] case." Id. Lastly, the dissent saw any
broader reading of Boys Markets as carrying its holding beyond the point necessary to
effectuate that decision's seminal policy consideration of preventing the circumvention
of arbitration. Id. See also Parade Publications, Inc. v. Philadelphia Mailers Union No.
14, 459 F.2d 369, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1972) (requiring ly remand that an employer show
that the dispute "underlying" a strike was arbitrable before allowing an injunction to
issue); Axelrod, supra note 23, at 924.
The NAPA dissent speculated that the majority had been swayed "by an unstated
feeling" that Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), had broadened the exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act created in Boys Markets. 502 F.2d at 331-32. According to Judge Hunter, however, Gateway had no such effect since in that case the strike
was not enjoined until the Court had found that the dispute underlying it was arbitrable. Id. at 332. He reasoned that this " 'underlying cause' " approach fostered the basic
policy rationale of Boys Markets, i.e., that only those strikes designed to circumvent the
arbitration process should be enjoined. Id. Since the dissent could find no deviation
from this labor policy in Gateway, it concluded that "the 'underlying cause' " test remained in full force. Id. at 333.
67 Id. at 331.
68 For a discussion of the NAPA dissent, see notes 58-67 supra and accompanying
text.
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tration process if the P & M locals' sympathy strike was not enjoined. 69 The Court reasoned that the concern in Boys Markets had
been with those strikes which were disrupting the arbitration process
and depriving the employer of his quid pro quo. 7 0 In Buffalo Forge,
however, the strike was not brought "over" an arbitrable grievance;
71
therefore, the union was not attempting to circumvent that process.
Furthermore, since the Court found the employer to have bargained
for a no-strike clause prohibiting only strikes "over" arbitrable issues,
the sympathy strike would not result in a loss of bargain. 72 Thus, the
federal policy at stake in Boys Markets, that of promoting the use of
"'private dispute settlement mechanisms," was not threatened by the
73
sympathy strike.
Absent an impairment of congressional labor policy, the Court
maintained that the Norris-LaGuardia Act precluded the issuance of
an injunction solely on the basis of an allegation that the strike violated the no-strike clause. 74 Although LMRA section 301(a) had
granted federal courts "a major role . . . in enforcing collective bar-

gaining agreements," precedent did not support the conclusion that
this power had been extended beyond "the enforcement of... arbitration provisions." 7 5 Nor could Norris-LaGuardia be disregarded by
the majority simply because the contract provided broad grievance
and arbitration mechanisms. It was reasoned that an injunction in the
present case would provide a basis for enjoining any alleged breach of
contract in the future and also deeply involve the courts in contract
interpretation. 76 In the Court's opinion, this result, would seriously
69 96 S. Ct. at 3149. The majority did concede that an injunction would be appropriate in the present situation to compel the parties to arbitrate and also to enforce the
arbitrator's final award. Id. at 3146.
70 Id. at 3147.
71 Id. Here the Court, without specific reference, apparently adopted the causal interpretation of the Boys Markets "over a grievance" phrasing previously enunciated in
Amstar and the NAPA dissent. The holdings of these cases are discussed in the text
accompanying notes 40 and 67 supra.
72 96 S. Ct. at 3147.

73 Id.
74 Id. at 3148.
75 Id. To bolster its argument the majority pointed out that in passing section 301(a),
Congress had declined to except injunctions enforcing collective bargaining agreements
from the provisions of Norris-LaGuardia. Id. Although this had also been an important
rationale for the Court's decision in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 205-08
(1962), it was later rejected in Boys Markets, where the Court asserted that "[t]he literal
terms of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act must be accommodated to the subsequently
enacted provisions of § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act and the purposes
of arbitration." 398 U.S. at 250; see 96 S. Ct. at 3154 n.ll (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76 96 S. Ct. at 3148.

1976]

NOTES

undermine the intent of Norris-LaGuardia and also involve the courts
77
in a potential flood of litigation.
The majority also reasoned that such judicial involvement had
not been contemplated by the parties when they struck the bargain.
Here the issue was concededly arbitrable and, pending the outcome,
the parties "ha[d] not contracted for a judicial preview of the facts
and the law."-78 The majority concluded that extensive judicial involvement would undermine the federal policy in favor of the estab79
lishment of private procedures for the adjustment of disputes.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens maintained that the issue
for determination was the extent of the enforceability by injunction of
the union's quid pro quo. 80 He characterized the majority's holding
as dividing the quid pro quo into two parts, with only that part pledging no strikes "over" arbitrable grievances susceptible to enforcement
by injunction. 8 ' The majority had exempted strikes not preceded by
an arbitrable dispute from the courts' injunctive powers based on
what the dissent perceived as a "literal interpretation of the NorrisLaGuardia Act" and an unwillingness to further involve the federal
courts in interpreting collective bargaining agreements. 8 2 The dissent
argued that the rationale underpinning the Boys Markets decision
compelled "a different result," and concluded that Boys Markets
could be read to permit a preliminary injunction when "convincing
77 Id. at 3148-49. Noting that as of 1972 "more than 21,000,000 workers . . . were
covered under more than 150,000 collective bargaining agreements," the Court reasoned that these figures were a harbinger of the amount of possible litigation federal
courts would face. Id. at 3149 n.12.
The dissent disputed the majority's interpretation of these figures, questioning
whether they foretold "the number of sympathy strikes which may violate an express
no-strike commitment." Id. at 3150 n.3. Observing that only "a dozen such cases [had]
arisen" in the last few years, the dissent stated that the number could be reduced further
by the parties making existing no-strike clauses more precise. Id.
78 Id. at 3149. The Court asserted that "[h]ad [the parties] anticipated additional
regulation of their relationships pending arbitration, it seems very doubtful that they
would have resorted to litigation rather than to private arrangements." Id.
79 See id.
80 Id, at 3150.
81 Id. at 3150 & n.2. The dissent noted that, although a strike in protest of an
arbitrator's decision would not be "over" an arbitrable grievance, the majority had admitted that such a strike could be enjoined. Id. at 3150 n.2. Thus, in this respect the
majority had deviated from its own causal standard. See id.
82 Id. at 3150. In response to the majority's first rationale, the dissent noted that
strict compliance with Norris-LaGuardia had been foregone in prior cases. Id. The second, according to the dissent, had been "implicitly rejected" in Gateway Coal Co. v.
UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), where the Court, in determining whether an exception to
the no-strike clause had been properly invoked, decided " 'a substantial question of
contractual interpretation.' " 96 S. Ct. at 3150 (quoting from 414 U.S. at 384).
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evidence [shows] that the strike is clearly within the no-strike
clause. "83
Justice Stevens' reading of Boys Markets centered on that
Court's distinction of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 8 4 and its concentration on fostering the negotiation of arbitration agreements by employers. 8 5 Because these agreements could, in most circumstances,
be created only by the mutual consent of the parties, 8 6 he found it
essential to provide employers with an assurance that a strike in
breach of a no-strike clause would be enjoined.8 7 Since a sympathy
strike could act to deprive an employer of his bargain had he
negotiated "for a no-strike clause that extends beyond strikes over
arbitrable disputes," Justice Stevens reasoned that a "public interest"
identical to that in Boys Markets could dictate the issuance of an
injunction in order to preserve the motivational factor.88
sa 96 S. Ct. at 3150, 3158. The dissent would also require that upon request by the
union the preliminary stages of the dispute settlement process be passed over. Id. at
3158-59. Justice Stevens justified this preliminary determination of the scope of the
no-strike clause on the grounds that the purpose of arbitration "[wa]s to remove completely any ambiguity in the agreement." Id. at 3156. Thus, when a breach of commitment is so clear that an arbitrator's decision would merely be pro forma, "it would be
reasonable to give . . . legal effect to [the parties'] agreement" pending final arbitration. Id.
"' Id. at 3151-52. The dissent observed that both Buffalo Forge and Boys Markets
"deal[t] with the enforceability of a collective-bargaining agreement rather than with
the process by which such agreements are negotiated and formed." Id. at 3152. For an
analysis of the contradictory policies expressed in the Norris-LaGuardia Act and section
301(a) of the LMRA, see notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
As further support, the dissent cited a number of cases, see 96 S. Ct. at 3153, in
which the federal policy against racial discrimination necessitated a departure from the
exact wording of Norris-LaGuardia. See, e.g., Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 234, 237 (1949) (agreement between employer and all-white
union to deny Negro employees promotions enjoined despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act
on ground that an injunction is the only effective method with which to protect rights of
Negro workers). See also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 770,
774 (1952).
'5See 96 S.Ct. at 3152-55.
at 3155. For an example of an arbitration procedure established by statute, see
88 Id.
The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 153-59 (1970).
87 96 S. Ct. at 3155. Justice Stevens reasoned that
[a] sympathy strike in violation of a no-strike clause does not directly frustrate
the arbitration process, but if the clause is not enforceable against such a strike,
it does frustrate the more basic policy of motivating employers to agree to binding arbitration by giving them an effective "assurance of uninterrupted operation during the term of the agreement."
Id. (quoting from Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 454 (1957)).
" See 96 S. Ct. at 3152-53; Aaron, The Strike and the Injunction-Problems of Remand and Removal, N.Y.U. 18TH ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 93, 101 (1966); Feller, A General
Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 663, 758-59 (1973).
Noting that it was possible that the union had not relinquished its right to engage
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A basic disagreement between the majority and the dissent was
whether the employer had received his full bargain. While Justice
Stevens was uncertain as to the extent of the no-strike clause, 89 the
majority found that the strike did not have "the effect . . . of depriving the employer of his bargain." 90 This finding may serve to explain
the majority's failure to address the motivational issue raised by Justice Stevens. Also, the majority's conclusion, in effect, amounted to a
preliminary determination of the arbitrable issue: the scope of the
no-strike clause. 9 1
Since an arbitrator may indeed thereafter conclude that the sympathy strike was illegal, the result of Justice White's finding is the
creation of a rebuttable presumption of the legality of the strike, at
least when an express general no-strike clause is involved. 92 Should
an arbitrator make a final award in favor of the employer, however,
the employer will have lost part of his bargain and, thus, to a certain
extent, the "incentive" 93 to enter into arbitration agreements deemed
necessary by the Boys Markets Court. 9 4 Of course, the danger of employers being discouraged from entering into arbitration agreements
is not as severe in a Buffalo Forge situation as it was in Boys
Markets, since an employer can still have strikes "over" arbitrable
grievances enjoined. 95 Nevertheless, Buffalo Forge, by prohibiting
96
the enjoining of sympathy strikes potentially in violation of contract,
could possibly deter certain affected employers from entering into fu-

in a sympathy strike, Justice Stevens stated that the policy of encouraging arbitration
applied only where sympathy strikes positively came under the no-strike clause. See 96
S. Ct. at 3153.
89 See 96 S. Ct. at 3153 (dissenting opinion).
90 Id. at 3147 (majority opinion).
91 See id. at 3146-47. Justice White initially stated that the issue of whether the
sympathy strike was illegal was a question to be determined by the arbitrator. Id. at
3146. The majority later found, however, that the strike did not result in a loss of the
employer's bargain. Id. at 3147.
92 See id. at 3146-47. Subsequent opinions have also interpreted Buffalo Forge as,
in effect, creating a presumption of the legality of a sympathy strike that may be rebutted before the arbitrator. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. UMW Local 6321, 548
F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1976) (Garth, J., concurring). See also NLRB v. Keller-Crescent Co., 538
F.2d 1291, 1296 (7th Cir. 1976).
93 398 U.S. at 248.
9 See 96 S. Ct. at 3155; Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974); 398
U.S. at 248, 252-53. See also William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417
U.S. 12, 18-19 (1974); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54 (1974). But see
note 31 supra (discussion of Professor Gould's observation that available statistics contradicted this portion of the Boys Markets decision).
95 96 S. Ct. at 3146.
9' See id. at 3146-49.
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ture arbitration agreements. 97 Moreover, the majority's silence may
be interpreted as an indication that the motivational policy is no
longer an important aspect of an analysis of the injunction question.
The majority objected to the dissent's suggested procedure for
insuring that the employer receive his bargain on the grounds that it
would lead to both an unacceptable erosion of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act and an additional judicial encroachment on the arbitration
process. 98 It is highly questionable, however, whether the NorrisLaGuardia Act precludes the dissent's suggested method of realizing
the motivational policy. When enacted, the Act was intended to insure that labor unions would not be deprived of the use of economic
power through the issuance of injunctions. 9 9 It is anomalous, however, to apply Norris-LaGuardia to protect breaches of contracts that
the same Act enabled the unions to enter into originally. 10 0 The Act
should instead be read in light of its past accommodation and should
not be deemed to prevent the enforcement of a valid collective bargaining agreement. '0 '
97Id. at 3155 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A related problem raised by the Buffalo
Forge decision is its apparent conflict with the federal policy of preserving state court
jurisdiction over suits for a breach of a collective bargaining agreement while maintaining a uniform labor law. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95
(1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 511 (1962). In the limited area
of suits seeking to enjoin sympathy strikes, forum shopping between federal courts and
state courts, where an injunction may still issue, will be encouraged and the goal of a
uniform federal labor law frustrated. See 96 S. Ct. at 3154-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
398 U.S. at 244-47; Keene, supra note 26, at 49.
9aSee 96 S. Ct. at 3148-49.
99See 398 U.S. at 250-51; Cox, supra note 29, at 253-54; Wellington, The No-Strike
Clause and the Labor Injunction: Time for a Re-examination, 30 U. PiTr. L. REV. 293,
304-05 (1968).
100See 398 U.S. at 252-53 & n.22; Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts,
59 MICH. L. REV. 673, 678 (1961).
101See 398 U.S. at 250-52; Cox, supra note 29, at 253-56; Keirnan, Availability of
Injunctions Against Breaches of No-Strike Agreements in Labor Contracts, 32 ALB. L.
REV. 303, 315 (1968); Stewart, supra note 100, at 683; Note, Accommodation of the
Norris-LaGuardiaAct to Other Federal Statutes, 72 HARV. L. REV. 354, 365-66 (1958).
But see Comment, Labor Injunctions and Judge-made Labor Law: The Contemporary
Role of Norris-LaGuardia,70 YALE L.J. 70, 94-100 (1960).
Justice White argued that contract enforcement in this case would indirectly lead to
an evisceration of Norris-LaGuardia in that all alleged breaches would be subject to
injunction. 96 S. Ct. at 3148-49. This fear, however, does not seem applicable to the
dissent's proposed procedure. First, under the dissent's proposal only illegal strikes
would be enjoined-not breaches of contract in general. See id. at 3158-59 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Secondly, there would have to be "convincing evidence that the strike is"
illegal in order for it to be enjoined. Id. at 3158. In addition, the majority does not take
sufficient cognizance of the fact that the arbitration agreement and the no-strike clause
are quid pro quo. Since only the no-strike commitment has this special relationship
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Although Norris-LaGuardia standing alone appears to provide insufficient support for the majority position, an adequate basis for the
majority's conclusion may exist in the Steelworkers Trilogy.10 2 The
Trilogy required that in order to protect the jurisdiction of the arbitrator judicial interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement be
limited to a finding of arbitrability, and no more. 10 3 Although the
later need for an injunction forced the court in Boys Markets beyond
a finding of mere arbitrability and into a determination of a no-strike
clause violation,' 0 4 the finding did not involve a great deal of contract
interpretation since the strike was clearly "over" an arbitrable grievance. 10 5 Buffalo Forge presented a different situation, in that the
strike was not "over" an arbitrable grievance, and the no-strike clause
contained no specific reference to sympathy strikes. Consequently,
whether the strike violated the no-strike clause was a more complex
question requiring greater judicial interpretation. 0 6 A judicial determination of this magnitude increases the possibility of error by the
court' 0 7 and, in addition, might later prejudice an arbitrator's deterwith the arbitration agreement, there would seem to be no strong policy reason for
enforcing other promises in the collective bargaining agreement by injunction. See id. at
3156-57 n.21.
102 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
"0 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960); id. at
570-71 (Brennan, J., concurring); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 585 (1960). According to the Court in Warrior & Gulf, parties
themselves prefer an arbitrator over a judge because he can bring to bear on the problem his knowledge of a particular industry and the variances of the labor-management
relationship. Id. at 582. But see P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION, A DISSENTING VIEW
47-54, 66-75 (1966). For an explication of the relevant differences between the roles of
an arbitrator and a judge, see Jones, Power and Prudence in the Arbitration of Labor
Disputes: A Venture in Some Hypotheses, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 675, 683-93 (1964).
104 See 398 U.S. at 254; note 36 supra.
105 See 96 S. Ct. at 3146; Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974); 398
U.S. at 254.
106
See 96 S. Ct. at 3149.
10 7
See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 581-82 (1960). Whether a sympathy strike is prohibited by an express general nostrike clause which makes no specific reference to sympathy strikes can be an intricate
question. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 247, 248 n.9 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1975 Term]. It may well be that neither party is exactly certain of
the scope of the no-strike clause. See Cox, supra note 25, at 1491; Shulman, Reason,
Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1004-05 (1955). Thus,
even a preliminary determination in that situation could cause the court to explore extensively the bargaining history, past agreements and common law of the shop. See
Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 1088, 1090 (8th Cir. 1972); 1975 Term,
supra at 248 n.9.
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1

Buffalo Forge differs from cases where the strike is directly
"over" an arbitrable dispute in another important respect. Although
the Court ruled in those cases that the strike violated the no-strike
clause, it refrained from ruling on the merits of the dispute that
caused the strike.10 9 On the other hand, by ruling on the scope of
the no-strike clause in a sympathy strike situation the Court would be
adjudicating the primary contract dispute that is to be determined by
the arbitrator. 110

The judicial incursion into the merits necessary to implement
the dissent's suggested motivational policy would, therefore, be
greater than that in a typical Boys Markets situation. Such an increased imposition would go beyond that condoned within previous cases and could not be limited effectively in the spirit of
the Steelworkers Trilogy."' In addition, the increased judicial intrusion needed to carry out the motivational policy would risk the
loss of the right to engage in sympathy strikes-a right protected
by section 7 of the NLRA11 2-through a mistaken preliminary de108See 96 S. Ct. at 3149.

109 Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 387-88 (1974); 398 U.S. at 254; see
Abrams, supra note 40, at 209; Gorman, supra note 36, at 613. In Boys Markets, the
strike was caused by a controversy over whether nonunion personnel could be used to
stock the frozen food shelves. 398 U.S. at 239. In Gateway Coal, the arbitrable issue
was whether the reinstatement of two foremen who had criminal prosecutions pending
against them for falsification of mine ventilation records constituted a safety hazard. 414
U.S. at 371-72.
11096 S. Ct. at 3146. See Abrams, supra note 40, at 209 & n.152; Gorman, supra
note 36, at 613.
"I Abrams, supra note 40, at 209-10.
112 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Section 7 reads in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
Id. While the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the subject of whether a sympathy strike is protected activity under section 7, in NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply
Co., Inc., 345 U.S. 71 (1953), the Court implied that, although subject to waiver, a refusal to cross a picket line was protected. Id. at 80; see NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420
U.S. 251, 260-62 (1975).
The circuit courts have split on the issue, with the majority holding that the right to
refuse to cross is protected. Compare Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 523 (6th Cir.)
(refusal to cross picket line is individual right "protected by law, whether . . . for
economic reasons, for the purpose of improving working conditions, or for mutual aid or
protection of employees who are members of another Union"), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
850 (1972); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 257, 258 (1st Cir. 1971)
(employee who refuses to cross picket line takes on rights of strikers and may not be
discharged); NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 55-56 (4th Cir.) (refusal to
cross picket line on principle is for mutual aid and protection and thus, protected activ-

)
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termination. 1 3 Moreover, while there has not been an exhaustive
study of the need to offer employers an incentive, existing empirical
data indicates that such motivation may not be necessary. 114
These factors should be weighed against the need to give employers incentive by enjoining a sympathy strike which the court has
found to be illegal prior to arbitration. In the specific factual setting of
Buffalo Forge-a no-strike clause without express inclusions and a
strike not "over" an arbitrable grievance-the majority's abandonment of the motivational policy appears justified. However, by refusing to squarely face the difficult problem of ordering and evaluating
the various policy demands, the majority has left unclear the weight
these policies should carry in factual settings differing from that pre5
sented in Buffalo Forge."1
The shortcomings of the majority holding would crystalize in a
case where the collective bargaining agreement contained a no-strike
provision forbidding a sympathy strike. In the face of this express
inclusion of sympathy strikes, it is difficult to discern how the
ity), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971) and NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426
F.2d 1299, 1301 (5th Cir. 1970) (employee who refuses to cross line on principle is
engaged in protected activity) with NLRB v. L. G. Everist, Inc., 334 F.2d 312, 317-18
(8th Cir. 1964) (refusal to cross is refusal to work and subjected employees to discharge
for cause) and NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 189 F.2d 124, 127-29 (7th Cir. 1951)
(employees could not act for mutual aid and protection individually, but only collectively through their bargaining unit). See generally Connolly, Section 7 and Sympathy
Strikes: The Respective Rights of Employers and Employees, 25 LAB. L.J. 760 (1974).
In addition, the primary striking unit would seem to have an interest in having its
picket line respected. See Abrams, supra note 40, at 196-97. An erroneously issued injunction may act to deprive the picketing union of legitimate bargaining power and
strengthen the employer's position. See id. at 197. To remedy this problem one commentator has suggested joining the primary striking unit in the action to enjoin the
sympathy strike as a necessary party under FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Abrams, supra at 202-04.
ii3 See Abrams, supra note 40, at 198-99; Connolly & Connolly,
supra note 39,
at 146.
114 See Gould, supra note 23, at 229-30 & n.63.
115 One commentator has suggested that under the majority's holding a possible loss
of the employer's bargain could be mitigated by submitting the issue to the arbitrator
for a preliminary determination. 1975 Terni, supra note 107, at 254; see Jones, supra
note 103, at 778. The court would then give effect to the award by injunction. 1975
Term, supra at 254. It is contended that such a procedure would be as speedy as a
judicial determination and would serve to keep the courts out of contract interpretation.
Id. A quick determination would also ensure the employer his quid pro quo and thus
discharge the motivational policy. However, it is questionable whether it is possible to
ensure that the arbitrator will reach a prompt decision. See NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v.
Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d at 328-29 (Hunter, J., dissenting), discussed
at note 64 supra. Although it seems likely that a court will enforce such an order, see
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-99 (1960), the
Supreme Court has never specifically so held. Moreover, such a solution offers little in
the way of constructing a definitive federal labor policy.
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majority's holding may fairly be applied. In such a case, the assumption made by the Buffalo Forge majority that the employer had bargained for a no-strike clause covering only strikes "over" an arbitrable
grievance, could not be made. That a sympathy strike would deprive
the employer of his bargain would be plain from the face of the col6
lective bargaining agreement. 11
In the case of an express inclusion of sympathy strikes, a weighing of the various factors leads to the conclusion that the motivational
policy should be maintained. Denial of enforcement of an express
union commitment may well serve to sour an employer's appetite for
entering future arbitration agreements. Furthermore, judicial intrusion would be minimal in that the violation of the contract would be
obvious, and there would be virtually no chance of the arbitrator
differing with the court's finding. 1 1 7 Despite the Buffalo Forge majority's emphasis on the strike being "over" an arbitrable grievance, the
enjoining of a sympathy strike when in violation of an express prohibition would be in line with the majority's reliance on the policy of
enforcing dispute settlement mechanisms as agreed upon by the
parties. 118 Moreover, it would be supportive of the federal policy in
favor of the collective bargaining process.119
As the majority and dissenting opinions both demonstrate, the
determination of whether to enjoin a strike pending arbitration of its
legality necessarily entails an analysis of numerous considerations. In
previous decisions, as well as in the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens, these competing considerations have been resolved in favor of a
greater degree of judicial involvement in the merits of labor disputes
and away from a literal reading of Norris-LaGuardia. 120 The majority's decision in Buffalo Forge, however, has for the present arrested
this trend.' 2 ' Whether the Court in the future adheres to the ma111See 96 S. Ct. at 3147.
117 See Note, supra note 39, at 139-40.
118 See 96 S. Ct. at 3147; Stokley-Van Camp, Inc. v. Thacker, 394 F. Supp. 715,
719-20 (W.D. Wash. 1975) (injunction issued to force union to comply with provisions of
collective bargaining agreement where "[t]here [wals no arguable legality to sympathy
strike").
119 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1957).
120 See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 377-84 (1974); 398 U.S. at 242-43,
251-53; Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455, 457-59 (1957).
121 Justice White's holding is consonant with the views he expressed as part of the
majority in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 203 (1962). For a discussion of
the Sinclair holding, see note 27 supra. Sinclair was subsequently overruled by Boys
Markets in which Justice White dissented for the reasons stated in Sinclair. 398 U.S. at
254-55, 261. It is also interesting to note that Justice Brennan, author of the Boys Markets
majority opinion, joined in Justice Stevens' dissent in Buffalo Forge. 96 S. Ct. at 3150.
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jority's reasoning in Buffalo Forge, the reliance by the majority
and the dissent on separate interpretations of Boys Markets illustrates
the present vague and often contradictory character of federal labor
policy.
In the wake of Buffalo Forge, the federal labor policy remains a
mdlange of various competing considerations. 1 22 The relevancy and
relative importance of these elements remains unclear. Policies have
been largely ignored without being explicitly overruled. As a result,
the theoretical framework from which the Court approaches various
situations is vague and confused. It may well be that the disparate
policies of preventing the circumvention of arbitration, encouraging
employers to agree to dispute settlement mechanisms, and keeping
the courts out of the merits of the disputes can never be adequately
accommodated, thus creating a serious need for congressional clarification of the national labor policy. Absent such action, it is uncertain
which approach will predominate, and policy will continue to be structured on a case-by-case basis.
Gregory Jaeger
122 In a case decided subsequent to Buffalo Forge, the Third Circuit has refused to
enjoin a sympathy strike. Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 545 F.2d 1336,
1341-42 (3d Cir. 1976) (lower court injunction of sympathy strike vacated on grounds
that strike not "over" an arbitrable grievance and thus was not an attempt to frustrate
the arbitration process). See also United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 418 F. Supp. 172,
174-75 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
In a concurring opinion in United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 548 F.2d 67 (3d Cir.
1976) (Garth, J., concurring), Judge Garth attempted to clarify the Buffalo Forge holding
by examining its application in light of various types of collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 74. The first type of contract would contain, in addition to an arbitration
clause, a no-strike clause explicitly forbidding sympathy strikes. Id. at 75. Judge Garth
maintained that under Buffalo Forge such a strike would be enjoinable pending arbitration. Id.
In a second type of situation such as that in Buffalo Forge, where the collective
bargaining agreement contained arbitration procedures and a no-strike clause with no
express inclusions, a sympathy strike could not be enjoined prior to arbitration. Id. The
legality of the sympathy strike, however, would be arbitrable and should the arbitrator
find the strike illegal the employer would then be able to obtain an injunction. Id.
The final class of contracts examined were those that provide for arbitration but do
not contain an express no-strike clause. Id. With respect to such agreements Judge
Garth stated that "Buffalo Forge established as a matter of law that a sympathy strike
does not violate a labor contract which falls into this category." Id. (emphasis in original). Consequently, the legality of such strikes would not even be arbitrable. Id.
One commentator, however, has disagreed with Judge Garth as to whether a sympathy strike in violation of an express prohibition would be enjoinable under Buffalo
Forge. Rains, Boys Markets Injunctions: Strict Scrutiny of the Presumption of Arbitrability, 28 LAB. L.J. 30, 37 (1977). Noting the Buffalo Forge majority's emphasis
on the "over" requirement, the author concluded that the sympathy strike would not
have been enjoined even if the no-strike clause had expressly included sympathy
strikes. Id.

